Emergence : Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science
Emergence: gimmicky readings in philosophy and science
Mark Bedau and Paul Humphreys (eds)
Bedau, Mark; Paul Humphreys (eds);
Emergence: contemporary readings in philosophy and science
MIT Press Bradford Books, 2008, 464 pages
ISBN 0262524759, 9780262524759
topics: | philosophy | science | emergence
Dennett: Real Patterns 189
Are at that place actually beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superseded ontology? Are centers of gravity in your ontology? [argument / idea expt from "Intentional Stance"] philosophers feel when information technology comes to behavior (and other mental items) ane must exist either a realist or an eliminative materialist. ... my analogizing beliefs to centers of gravity has been attacked from both sides of the ontological dichotomy, by philosophers who call up it is simply obvious that centers of gravity are useful fictions, and past philosophers who think information technology is simply obvious that centers of gravity are perfectly real: The trouble with these supposed parallels . . . is that they are all strictly speaking false, although they are no doubt useful simplifications for many purposes. It is false, for example, that the gravitational attraction betwixt the Earth and the Moon involves 2 point masses; but information technology is a good enough first approximation for many calculations. However, this is not at all what Dennett really wants to say about intentional states. For he insists that to adopt the intentional opinion and translate an agent as interim on certain beliefs and desires is to discern a design in his actions which is genuinely there (a pattern which is missed if we instead adopt a scientific opinion): Dennett certainly does not agree that the role of intentional ascriptions is merely to give us a useful approximation to a truth that can exist more accurately expressed in not-intentional terms.3 Compare this with Fred Dretske's4 equally confident exclamation of realism: I am a realist about centers of gravity. . . . The world plainly exerts a gravitational attraction on all parts of the moon—non just its center of gravity. The resultant force, a vector sum, acts through a point, but this is something quite different. 1 should be very clear near what centers of gravity are before deciding whether to be literal about them, before deciding whether or not to be a eye-of-gravity realist. (ibid., p. 511) trivial abstract object: Dennett's lost sock center: the point divers as the center of the smallest sphere that can exist inscribed around all the socks I take ever lost in my life. [has] the aforementioned metaphysical status as centers of gravity. centers of gravity are real considering they are (somehow) adept abstract objects. I have claimed that beliefs are all-time considered to be abstract objects rather like centers of gravity. Dennett's position: a mild and intermediate sort of realism is a positively bonny position,patterns A to F. Are they different or aforementioned? Dennett reveals that pattern A to F were Generated past having a program write 10 lines, each west 10 dots then ten blanks, with noise: A to F: 25% x% 25% ane% 33% 50%. Chaitin's definition of randomness as incompressibility. How many bits do we demand to transmit the prototype? a. all 900 bits - needed for F b. "ten foursquare patterns", except for dots at 55, 73, etc. - may exist smaller for patterns with greater "regularity" - B, D etc. Any shorter clarification is a description of a existent pattern in the data.
Contents
Preface ix Acknowledgments xi Sources xiii Introduction 1
I Philosophical Perspectives on Emergence 7
Introduction to Philosophical Perspectives on Emergence 1 The Ascent and Fall of British Emergentism 19 Brian P. McLaughlin 2 On the Thought of Emergence 61 Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim iii Reductionism and the Irreducibility of Consciousness 69 John Searle iv Emergence and Supervenience 81 Brian P. McLaughlin 5 Aggregativity: Reductive Heuristics for Finding Emergence 99 William C. Wimsatt half-dozen How Properties Emerge 111 Paul Humphreys 7 Making Sense of Emergence 127 Jaegwon Kim 8 Downwards Causation and Autonomy in Weak Emergence 155 Mark A. Bedau 9 Real Patterns 189 Daniel C. Dennett
II Scientific Perspectives on Emergence 207
Introduction to Scientific Perspectives on Emergence x More than Is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of the Hierarchical Structure of Scientific discipline 221 P. W. Anderson 11 Emergence 231 Andrew Assad and Norman H. Packard 12 Sorting and Mixing: Race and Sexual activity 235 Thomas Schelling thirteen Culling Views of Complication 249 Herbert Simon 14 The Theory of Everything 259 Robert B. Laughlin and David Pines 15 Is Anything Ever New? Considering Emergence 269 James P. Crutchfield xvi Design, Observation, Surprise! A Test of Emergence 287 Edmund G. A. Ronald, Moshe Sipper, and Mathieu S. Capcarre`re 17 Ansatz for Dynamical Hierarchies 305 Steen Rasmussen, Nils A. Baas, Bernd Mayer, and Martin Nillson
3 Background and Polemics 335
Introduction to Background and Polemics 18 Newtonianism, Reductionism, and the Art of Congressional Testimony 345 Stephen Weinberg 19 Bug in the Logic of Reductive Explanations 359 Ernest Nagel xx Chaos 375 James P. Crutchfield, J. Doyne Farmer, Norman H. Packard, and Robert S. Shaw 21 Undecidability and Intractability in Theoretical Physics 387 Stephen Wolfram 22 Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science equally a Working Hypothesis) 395 Jerry Fodor 23 Supervenience 411 David Chalmers 24 The Nonreductivist's Troubles with Mental Causation 427 Jaegwon Kim
amitabha mukerjee (mukerjee [at-symbol] gmail) 2012 February 12
Source: https://www.cse.iitk.ac.in/users/amit/books/bedau-2008-emergence-contemporary-readings.html
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